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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: UTAH'S CABLE DECENCY
ACT: AN INDECENT ACT?
The Utah district court opinion in Community Television v. Wilkin-
son' ("Wilkinson") gives the impression that Utah's statute prohibiting
"indecency" on cable television was as indecent as the material it sought
to suppress.2 In finding Utah's attempt to regulate decency unconstitu-
tional, the court ensured that "people can watch in their homes what
they can see in their neighborhood movie theatres."3
On April 20, 1983, the Utah legislature passed the Cable Television
Programming Decency Act ("Decency Act" or "the Act")4 which em-
powered state officials to bring civil nuisance actions against anyone dis-
tributing "indecent" material on any cable television network.5 The
Utah legislature purposefully stepped beyond the legal definition of "ob-
scenity," most recently set out in the Supreme Court case of Miller v.
California6 ("Miller"), in order to control actions and speech which
would not be considered obscene under the Miller guidelines. The Act
1. 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D.C. Utah 1985). The district court decision was subsequently
affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in a per curiam decision. Jones v. Wilkinson
("Jones"), 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986). On March 23, 1987, the United States Supreme
Court issued a one sentence order which affirmed the holding of the lower court. Only Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor voted to hear argu-
ments on the case. Jones v. Wilkinson, No. 86-1125 (March 23, 1987). Arizona, Kansas,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Washing-
ton and West Virginia joined Utah in the appeal to the Supreme Court.
2. Of course, the Utah law is not "indecent" in the strict legal sense which has been given
to this term by the courts in recent years, but it is possibly indecent in a more colloquial sense.
3. L.A. Times, March 24, 1987, Pt. I, at 1, col. 4 (quoting a cable television spokesman).
4. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1701 to 76-10-1708 (Supp. 1986).
5. The Utah Decency Act defines indecency as:
[A] visual or verbal depiction, display, representation, dissemination, or verbal
description of:
(a) A human sexual or excretory organ or function; or,
(b) A state of undress so as to expose the human male or female genitals, pubic
area, or buttocks, with less than a fully opaque covering, or showing of the female
breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion below the top of the
nipple; or,
(c) An ultimate sexual act, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; or,
(d) Masturbation;
which the average person applying contemporary community standards for cable tel-
evision or pay-for-viewing television programming would find is presented in a pa-
tently offensive way for the time, place, manner and context in which the material is
presented.
Cable Television Programming Decency Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1702(4) (Supp.
1986).
6. 413 U.S. 15 (1972).
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defined "indecent" material as "the visual or verbal depiction or descrip-
tion of human sexual or excretory organs or functions [or] exposure of
genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or the showing of any portion of the fe-
male breast below the top of the nipple."
7
The day after the Utah legislature passed the Decency Act, several
cable networks' and other interested parties filed suit in the federal dis-
trict court against the Attorney General of Utah, David Wilkinson.
Amicus briefs from such organizations as Morality in Media,9 the Fed-
eral Communications Commission ("FCC"), and Citizens for Positive
Community Values were accepted by the court. 1° Both sides submitted
motions for summary judgment. The Utah district court ultimately held
for the plaintiffs and granted a permanent injunction against enforcement
of the Decency Act on grounds of preemption and because it represented
an unconstitutional violation of First Amendment rights."'
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Federal Preemption
The first question the Utah district court dealt with was the relation-
ship between federal power and the state's legitimate police power, re-
7. See supra note 5 for text of the Decency Act.
8. Community Television of Utah, Community Cable of Utah, Inc., Utah Satellite, Inc.
and Wasatch Community T.V., Inc. filed a federal suit for injunctive and declaratory relief,
alleging infringement of their First Amendment rights. The court allowed Home Box Office to
intervene as an additional plaintiff.
9. This organization is dedicated to eliminating what it perceives as obscenity and inde-
cency. It publishes a monthly newsletter entitled THE OBSCENITY LAW BULLETIN which
criticizes and approves various trends in the law in this area. A recent issue gave an accurate
summary of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Jones. 10 THE OBSCENITY L.
BULL. 1 (Oct., 1986). The editors of the Bulletin approvingly noted in a comment that "there
are those who [believe] that 'indecency' in the broadcast media is of the same nature as obscen-
ity and can be prohibited as unprotected speech." Id. at 4.
A view such as this has a potential for substantial curtailment of First Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court has said explicitly and repeatedly that "indecency" is not wholly unpro-
tected speech. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (where Justice
Stevens first enunciated the court's theory of partially protected speech in the context of "inde-
cency"). In speaking about adult theatres showing explicit, but not necessarily obscene, mater-
ials, Justice Stevens said that "[e]ven though the First Amendment protects communication in
this area from total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately use the content of
these materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification from other motion
pictures." Id. at 52. It is significant that four justices, who joined in a dissent to Justice
Stevens' opinion, sought even greater constitutional protection for "indecency" than the ma-
jority. The dissent admitted that "the kind of expression at issue here is no doubt objectiona-
ble to some [but insisted] that that fact does not diminish its protected [status]." Id. See infra
note 33.
10. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1101.
11. Id. at 1117.
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garding content regulation for cable television. Shortly after the Decency
Act was passed, Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984 ("Policy Act"). 2 The Policy Act stated, inter alia, that no fed-
eral agency, state or franchising authority could regulate content except
as provided by the Policy Act.' 3
The district court first considered section 612(h) of the Policy Act,
which asserted that a franchising authority may deny a cable license if
the provider of the cable service broadcasts material that is "obscene, or
in conflict with community standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy,
or indecent or is otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United
States." 14 The district court noted that, while Congress clearly intended
to regulate material beyond that which could be considered legally ob-
scene"3 by including material which was merely "lewd" or "indecent,"
the exclusive remedy set out under section 612(h) was the denial or non-
renewal of a cable license.' 6 The Wilkinson court then observed that the
section gave power to the cable franchising authority, ' 7 and not to a state
legislature, to withhold licensing of cable stations. Thus, the civil nui-
sance remedy authorized by Utah's Decency Act'8 was impermissible
12. Cable Communications Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780 (1984) (codified
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (Supp. 1986)) [hereinafter Policy Act].
13. Policy Act § 624(f)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 544(f)(1). The Policy Act states that "[a]ny Fed-
eral agency, State, or franchising authority may not impose requirements regarding the provi-
sion or content of cable services, except as expressly provided in this title." Id.
14. The section reads:
Any cable service offered pursuant to this section shall not be provided, or shall
be provided subject to conditions, if such cable service in the judgment of the
franchising authority is obscene, or in conflict with community standards in that it is
lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent or is otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of
the United States.
Policy Act § 612(h), 47 U.S.C. § 532(h).
Strictly speaking, "lewd" or "indecent" speech is not "unprotected" by the Constitution.
See supra note 9 and infra note 33. Therefore, the constitutionality of § 612(h) is problematic.
The language of the Wilkinson court suggests awareness of this problem: "Assuming, argu-
endo that § 612(h) is constitutionally valid, it does not authorize the restrictions in the Utah
Decency Act." (emphasis in original) Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1103.
15. As defined by the court in Miller. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
16. Section 612 also permits a franchiser to confer a license "subject to conditions," but
there is no indication of additional civil or criminal penalties for "violations." Policy Act
§ 612, 47 U.S.C. § 532.
17. The Policy Act indicated that a license could be denied, or given subject to conditions,
if the cable station broadcast material that "in the judgment of the franchising authority is
obscene .... Policy Act § 612(h), 47 U.S.C. § 532(h). The Policy Act defines a "franchising
authority" as an entity empowered by state, federal or local law to confer franchises. Policy
Act § 602, 47 U.S.C. § 522(9). Clearly, the Attorney General of Utah did not represent a
franchising authority under this definition.
18. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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and pre-empted by the Policy Act. 9
The court also noted that section 612 of the Policy Act contained a
special provision designed to compel cable operators to keep a certain
number of channels open to independent operators in order to promote
more diverse programming.2" The cable companies were required to
broadcast these independent stations alongside their own programming,
without exercising any control over the independent operators.2' Con-
gress expressly shielded the cable operator from any civil or criminal lia-
bility that might result from these transmissions.22
Utah's Decency Act permitted civil nuisance proceedings against a
cable operator for broadcasting a program that was indecent, even
though the material was on a channel provided to an independent station
by the cable company over which the cable company had no editorial
control.23 The Policy Act did not sanction this result. To the contrary,
section 612 made it clear that the license of the independent operator,
and not that of the cable company, could be revoked if the independent
operator broadcast "lewd" or "indecent" material. For these reasons,
the court found that section 612 preempted the Decency Act rather than
supported it.
24
19. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1103.
20. The Policy Act states that "[t]he purpose of this section is to assure that the widest
possible diversity of information sources are made available to the public from cable systems in
a manner consistent with growth and development of cable systems." Policy Act § 612(a), 47
U.S.C. § 532(a). The section goes on to require that cable operators broadcasting between
thirty-six and fifty-four stations set aside ten percent of their channels for use by persons not
affiliated with the operator. Policy Act § 612(b)(1)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(l)(A). Larger op-
erators are required to set aside as much as fifteen percent of their channels. Policy Act
§ 612(b)(1)(C), 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1)(C).
21. Obviously, the congressional objective of diverse programming would be compromised
if cable operators, who were required to provide a certain percentage of their stations to per-
sons with whom they were not affiliated, could nevertheless edit or otherwise control the mate-
rial of these "independent" broadcasters. For this reason, Congress prohibited the "parent"
cable operator from interfering with the "child" cable station:
A cable operator shall not exercise any editorial control over any video pro-
gramming provided pursuant to this section, or in any other way consider the con-
tent of such programming, except that an operator may consider such content to the
minimum extent necessary to establish a reasonable price for the commercial use of
designated channel capacity by an unaffiliated person.
Policy Act § 612(c)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(2).
22. Policy Act § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558. Since cable operators were forced by Congress to
provide these channels to independent operators, and since they were prohibited from editing
the material of the independent broadcasters, it would be unfair to punish the cable operator
for transgressions perpetrated by the independent stations. For this reason, Congress sheltered
the cable operator from any civil or criminal liability resulting from the material broadcast by
the independent stations. Id.
23. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1103.
24. Id. The court said that § 612 "only applies to a limited number of commercial chan-
[Vol. 7
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The Wilkinson court then examined section 611 of the Policy Act
which, in the public interest, created another special class of channels
which cable companies may be required to broadcast alongside their own
programming. Franchising authorities were given the power to require
cable operators to set aside a certain number of channels for public, edu-
cational or governmental use ("PEG" channels).25 The cable operator
was prevented from exercising editorial control over these stations 26 and
section 638 of the Policy Act expressly immunized cable operators from
civil or criminal liability regarding the content of these stations. The
only sanction permitted to state authorities for objectionable program
content was the refusal of a franchise or its renewal. 27 The Wilkinson
court concluded that the "Policy Act [thus] forbids civil [nuisance] ac-
tions against cable operators concerning the content of these [PEG]
channels.
28
The final section of the Policy Act the court examined for guidance
on the permissible extent of state regulation was section 638.29 The Wil-
kinson court said that this was the regulation in the Policy Act which
applied to all cable stations other than the PEG and independent com-
mercial stations. The court said that "[i]t is therefore the last section of
the Policy Act that might arguably authorize the enforcement of the
Utah law." 3
This section provided that nothing in the statute should be under-
stood "to limit the criminal or civil liability of cable operators pursuant
to the Federal, State or local law of libel, slander, obscenity, incitement,
invasions of privacy, false or misleading advertising or other similar
nels which have special editorial restrictions. Utah's Cable Decency Act covers significant
areas of cable program distribution outside the scope of § 612. . . . [T]herefore [§ 612] ex-
pressly pre-empts, rather than authorizes, the Utah law with regard to these channels." Id.
25. Policy Act § 611, 47 U.S.C. § 531.
26. Policy Act § 611(e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(e).
27. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1103 (citing § 624(d)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(1)). The Pol-
icy Act gives the cable company some control regarding the PEG channels. The relevant
section says that "[s]ubject to section 544(d) of this title, a cable operator shall not exercise any
editorial control over any [PEG station]." Policy Act § 611(e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(e). Section
544(d) permits the franchising authority and a cable company to issue a license to a PEG
station subject to the condition that it shall not broadcast obscene material. Policy Act
§ 624(d), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d). It is nevertheless true, as the Wilkinson court noted, that § 638
expressly precludes a cable operator from civil or criminal liability regarding these stations.
The section states, in relevant part, that "cable operators shall not incur any [civil or criminal
liability] for any program carried on any channel designated for [PEG] use .... " Policy Act
§ 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558.
28. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1103.
29. Policy Act § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558.
30. 611 F. Supp. at 1103.
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laws."31 The court drew attention to the conspicuous absence of "inde-
cency" in this laundry list of areas in which the state was permitted to
regulate the content of cable television. This was significant since the
legislators were well aware of the distinction between legal obscenity and
indecency.32 Here was a classic list of the areas of unprotected speech in
the First Amendment area with a conscious omission of "indecency."
The reason for this was that Congress recognized indecency to be an area
of speech not wholly unprotected.33
The Wilkinson court concluded, from this discussion, that the ques-
tion of federal pre-emption was reducible to the question of whether the
Utah law was constitutionally valid since the states retained the power,
under the Policy Act, to regulate under the auspices of constitutionally
valid civil and criminal laws. Thus, if the Utah law was constitutionally
problematic it was, at the same time, pre-empted by the Policy Act.34 It
became necessary, therefore, for the court to determine whether the De-
cency Act was an unconstitutional infringement upon First Amendment
rights.
B. First Amendment Analysis
First the court considered whether the Decency Act was overbroad
on its face. The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has shown
31. Policy Act § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558. Judge Baldock, in his Tenth Circuit concurring
opinion, argued that the phrase "or other similar laws" was intended by Congress to allow for
appropriate state laws regulating indecency on cable television. See infra note 57 and accom-
panying text.
32. Wilkinson. 611 F. Supp. at 1104.
33. Id. Justice Stevens has been instrumental in the development of a theory of a hierar-
chy of speech which is deserving of various degrees of protection. See generally Young v.
American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upheld a Detroit ordinance designed to confine
."indecent," namely sexually explicit, movies to certain parts of the city). Political speech is at
the high end of the spectrum and deserves the full protection of the First Amendment. It can
only be curtailed when the state has a compelling state interest and the regulation is narrowly
tailored. Obscenity is totally unprotected by the First Amendment, according to the Court.
Commercial speech is midway between protected and unprotected speech. See, e.g., Virginia
Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (affirmed reversal of
conviction for advertising price of prescription drugs). The Court has determined that "inde-
cency" (speech that is less than obscene) is also quasi-protected. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (held "indecent" dirty words routine by comedian George Carlin was not
protected speech). See supra note 9. See infra notes 60 and 69 for further discussion of the
view that only wholly unprotected speech is included in section 638 of the Policy Act.
34. The Wilkinson court said that "[i]n summary, the Policy Act links power with princi-
ple. The Policy Act preserves state power to regulate program content that the first amend-
ment does not protect. If state regulations are unconstitutional, they are also pre-empted
under the terms of the Policy Act. The final resolution of the pre-emption question necessarily
requires a ruling on the First Amendment issue." 611 F. Supp. at 1105. See infra note 74 and
accompanying text.
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reluctance to invalidate legislation on its face and has preferred to strike
legislation only as applied to the facts at hand." The more drastic mea-
sure is applied only when a law is invalid as written and regardless of
how it might be applied to particular factual situations.
In order to determine if the Decency Act violated constitutional
standards, the Wilkinson court began by citing Miller36 which provided a
three part test for obscenity. To find material obscene, the Miller test
required that (1) an average person using contemporary community stan-
dards would find the material as a whole appeals to the "prurient inter-
est"; (2) the material depicts sexual conduct in "a patently offensive way"
in relation to applicable state law; and, (3) the work "taken as a whole
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." All three ele-
ments must be present for the material to be obscene.37
Utah's Decency Act did not require that the regulated material ap-
peal to the prurient interest or that it lack serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical or scientific value. Thus, the legislature largely ignored the Miller
requirements. Furthermore, the Decency Act attempted to restrict mate-
rial which did not depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, since
it only required that material be "offensive" for the time, place and man-
ner shown, with no requirement of sexually related material.38 Since the
Decency Act ignored essential requirements set out by the Miller test,
the federal district court concluded that the Act could not be justified
under the constitutional guidelines permitting state regulation of obscen-
ity, as stated in Miller.39
The defendants argued that the case of FCC v. Pacifica
("Pacifica")" extended state regulatory powers beyond the arena of legal
35. Id. at 1106 (referring to facial invalidation as "strong medicine"). See, e.g., Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1972).
36. 413 U.S. 15 (1972).
37. Id. at 24. The Miller definition of obscenity cuts back considerably on the liberality of
the formulation in the famous Roth case. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In Roth,
Justice Brennan structured the three part test so that the third prong required that the mate-
rial, to be obscene, must be "utterly without redeeming social importance." 354 U.S. at 484.
Now, under Miller, the third prong requires that the material possess serious cultural value in
order that it may be "redeemed."
38. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1108 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1702(4)). Judge
Baldock, in his concurring opinion in Jones, said that the "district court correctly pointed out
that the Cable Decency Act does not conform to the Miller obscenity test." However, Judge
Baldock could not "agree that the [Decency Act] fails to satisfy the 'patently offensive sexual
conduct' element of the Miller test," and he followed Morality in Media's view that the Miller
test is too liberal and is therefore "inadequate to regulate sexually oriented material on cable
television." Jones, 800 F.2d at 997.
39. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp at 1109.
40. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
1987]
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obscenity to include indecency. Pacifica was a fascinating case which
involved the comedian George Carlin. Performing in front of a live audi-
ence in California, Carlin shocked and amused his listeners by satirizing
society's fear of certain "dirty" words by repeatedly using them on stage.
Trouble arose when a public radio station broadcasted Carlin's routine
and a young child heard it while a passenger in his father's car. The
father complained to the FCC who in turn issued a declaratory order
against the station. The Supreme Court upheld the FCC decision to rep-
rimand the station even though the material was not obscene under the
Miller test.4 '
The Supreme Court reasoned that radio broadcasting is a unique
medium because children have easy access to it, radios are in the home
where special privacy interests exist, unconsenting adults may tune in a
station without effective warning of its content, and there is a scarcity of
spectrum space, justifying FCC intrusion on behalf of the public inter-
est.42 The Utah district court emphasized that the cable television me-
dium was distinguishable from public radio and did not warrant the same
degree of protection.4 3 The court observed that the Supreme Court in-
tended the Pacifica holding to be a narrow one which should perhaps be
limited to the special circumstances of that case.' Finally, the Wilkinson
court found it significant that the "punishment" sanctioned by the Court
in Pacifica was extremely mild and fell far short of the remedies envi-
sioned by the Utah legislature.45
41. Id.
42. Id. at 748-49.
43. The court found the differences significant between the radio medium in which limited
intrusion beyond obscenity had been sanctioned by Pacifica, and the cable television industry
which was presently involved. Cable television is invited into the home by consenting adults
who are generally charged a fee for the service. The companies are required to provide lock-
boxes so that parents can prevent access by their children when this is thought necessary. The
programming of cable television is comprehensively displayed in guides with warnings which
may be consulted by concerned adults. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1113.
44. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1110. The Wilkinson court quoted from a House Commit-
tee Report, prepared in connection with the Policy Act, which acknowledged that several
federal cases had previously held there were substantial constitutional problems in applying an
indecency standard to the medium of cable television. Id. at 1105 (citing H.R. REP. No. 934,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 69-70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 4655,
4732). See Community Television of Utah v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982);
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982). The district court also
noted that Bolger v. Youngs Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) had already given some gui-
dance on the question of whether Pacifica could be applied to other media of expression. In
Bolger, the United States Supreme Court declined to uphold a federal statute restricting the
mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements. The Wilkinson court said that "the
Bolger case largely limited Pacifica to its facts." 611 F. Supp. at 1116.
45. 611 F. Supp. at 1110.
[Vol. 7
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The state of Utah argued that it intended to enforce the Decency
Act only during daytime hours despite the absence of such a limitation in
the Act itself. The court did not accept the Utah Attorney General's
plan of enforcement because the Attorney General could not control the
actions of a local government that might insist on full enforcement of the
express terms of the Decency Act. Such a promised application of
prosecutorial discretion could not cure the constitutional defect where
there was a significant departure from constitutional standards.46
The Utah district court examined the Eleventh Circuit case of Cruz
v. Ferre ("Cruz")47 which had considered a similar problem to that
presented in Wilkinson. In Cruz, a Miami city ordinance threatened ter-
mination or suspension of the provider's cable license if the provider dis-
tributed indecent material. The Cruz court held that the Miami
ordinance was overbroad since it went beyond the test for obscenity out-
lined in Miller.
4 8
C. Decency at the Right Time and Place?
Finally, the court considered the Policy Act as a possible "time,
place and manner" restriction.49 The Supreme Court has permitted gov-
ernment to restrict speech where the regulation is not aimed at the con-
tent of the speech and the purpose of the regulation is to channel speech
to an appropriate time or place.5°
The Wilkinson court noted that the Decency Act contained "time,
place and manner" language. The Act required that the average person
applying community standards must find the material patently offensive
"for the time, place, manner and context in which the material is
presented."5 Despite this language, the court held that the Decency Act
was designed to regulate the content of expression to ensure that it was
"decent."52 Furthermore, this general time, place and manner restriction
46. Id. at 1109. The court held that rules promulgated by Attorney General Wilkinson
purporting to limit "indecency" to "adult viewing hours" were unsatisfactory since the lan-
guage of the Decency Act was itself too broad and because a subsequent Attorney General
could rescind such rules. Furthermore, the Decency Act did not provide for such regulatory
control by the Attorney General of Utah. Id. at 1115.
47. 755 F.2d 1415 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
48. Id. at 1418. The Cruz court also noted that the Miami ordinance disregarded the time
of day and the parents' ability to control access to the medium by their children. Id.
49. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1116.
50. Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
51. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1702(4). See supra note 5 for text.
52. 611 F. Supp. at 1116. Content-neutral time, place and manner regulations are "accept-
able so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unrea-
sonably limit alternative avenues of communication." City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
1987]
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failed to give cable operators adequate notice of what could or could not
be shown. Without clear notice guidelines the Decency Act was not only
overbroad on its face but also void for vagueness.53
VIEW FROM THE TENTH CIRCUIT
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Utah district court opinion, noting
that "[t]he district court has written a comprehensive opinion with which
we agree, and to which we can add little of value. We affirm its judgment
on the basis of the reasons stated in the opinion. '" 54 The opinion con-
tained a special concurrence by Judge Baldock who wrote separately be-
cause he believed the Policy Act did not entirely pre-empt state
regulation of "sexually oriented content which is not obscene."55 Judge
Baldock believed that the federal Policy Act permitted state regulation of
indecency "provided that the regulation is a time, place and manner re-
striction that is narrowly drawn and exists for the protection of mi-
nors." 56  He thought that the decision of the lower court was misguided
to the extent that it suggested that such regulation was not permissible
under the Policy Act. Judge Baldock voted for affirming the decision of
the lower court because he did not believe that the Decency Act repre-
sented a narrowly tailored regulation."
Inc., 472 U.S. 1006 (1986). Justice Rehnquist said the Renton statute "treats theatres that
specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theatres [but nevertheless, the] ordi-
nance is aimed not at the content of the films shown [but only] the secondary effects of such
theatres on the surrounding community." Id. This reasoning comes dangerously close to a
suggestion that any speech could be restricted, so long as the justification for doing so was not
to inhibit the transmission of ideas but rather to prevent the objectionable behavior that may
occur as a result of the transmission of those ideas. In American Booksellers Ass'n. v. Hud-
nut, Judge Easterbrook described how such a concept can lead to the complete abrogation of
the First Amendment. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
53. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1117.
54. Jones, 800 F.2d at 991.
55. Judge Baldock voted to affirm the lower court decision with regard to Utah's Decency
Act. He agreed the Decency Act was not drafted narrowly enough. However, he thought that
it was improper for the court to suggest that states were preempted by the Policy Act from
constructing narrowly tailored regulations regarding sexually related non-obscene material.
He said that he wrote "separately because [he did] not agree with this court's apparent conclu-
sion that federal law preempts state regulation of sexually oriented content which is not ob-
scene." 800 F.2d at 992. See infra note 70 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the
extent to which the district court did suggest that states were preempted from regulating on
cable television all non-obscene material.
56. 800 F.2d at 992.
57. He wrote that in his "view, Pacifica is relevant to the regulation of indecency on cable
television, but the Utah Cable Decency Act is not a valid time, place and manner restraint on
indecency even under Pacifica." 800 F.2d at 1004. He thought that even if, as he believed,
indecency could be regulated on cable television, the Utah law was "not acceptable because it
is a complete prohibition rather than regulation." Id. at 1007.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Judge Baldock found a basis for his belief that Congress did not
intend to pre-empt state regulation of sexually related non-obscene mate-
rial in the language of the Policy Act which reserved to the states the
right to enforce laws relating to defamation, false advertising, obscenity
or other similar laws.58 He then provided his own analysis to decide
"whether the phrase 'other similar laws' includes laws pertaining to inde-
cency .... " 59 He concluded that Congress had intended to include valid
cable indecency regulation within the scope of "other similar laws. '
ANALYSIS
The Utah district court has provided a thoughtful analysis of the
complex issues involved in indecency cases. The distinction between ob-
scenity and indecency was amply illustrated, the Policy Act thoughtfully
interpreted and the relevant case law analyzed and applied in a plausible
way.
One might ask whether the "strong medicine"6 of a facial invalidity
finding was really called for in this case. As the Supreme Court stated in
Pacifica "[i]nvalidating any rule on the basis of its hypothetical applica-
tion to situations not before the Court is 'strong medicine' to be applied
'sparingly and only as a last resort.' "62
Wilkinson may be distinguished from Pacifica in several respects. In
Pacifica a specific factual situation was presented to the court by Carlin's
speech and its subsequent radio broadcast. It was thus possible to rule
on the constitutionality of the rule as applied in those circumstances.
In contrast, the Wilkinson court was not faced with a specific appli-
cation of the Decency Act, since the suit did not arise as a result of an
action against any cable service, but rather, out of a fear of such suits. It
was thus not open to the Wilkinson court to make a narrower holding
and rule on the constitutionality of the statute as applied. The alterna-
58. Policy Act § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558.
59. Jones, 800 F.2d at 994.
60. Judge Baldock considered the same legislative history (see supra note 44) that the
lower court examined, to arrive at his conclusion. Jones, 800 F.2d at 994. The district court's
view that "other similar laws" is restricted to laws regulating speech which has been declared
by the Court to be wholly unprotected is supported by the fact that the Pacifica ruling had
come down several years prior to the drafting of the Policy Act. But see infra note 69 and
accompanying text. If Congress had believed that Pacifica had authorized indecency regula-
tion on cable television the Policy Act would have been the place to clearly say so.
61. In Pacifica, the Court "decline[d] to administer that medicine to preserve the vigor of
patently offensive sexual and excretory speech." 438 U.S. at 743.
62. 438 U.S. at 743 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
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tive would have been to wait until Utah had attempted to enforce the
Decency Act.
If Utah had attempted to enforce the Decency Act in an inappropri-
ate way, then perhaps the district court could have adjudicated the valid-
ity of the Decency Act. This certainly would have lent added authority
to the court's proposition that the law was overbroad and easily capable
of misapplication. However, it might have been years before the case
reached the courts and in the meantime, there would have been a signifi-
cant chilling effect created by the statute.63 Indeed, it was this fear which
brought the Wilkinson plaintiffs into court for declaratory and injunctive
relief. 4
It is important to note that the FCC, although temperate in its re-
sponse to the Carlin broadcast, was nevertheless authorized to apply har-
sher sanctions than it did. When the FCC issued its declaratory order to
Pacifica Foundation, it warned that it had the power to revoke a license,
to issue a cease and desist order, to impose a monetary fine and deny
renewal or subject it to conditions.65
The Wilkinson court noted that the Pacifica Court went out of its
way to "emphasize the narrowness of [its] holding."66 The Wilkinson
court speculated that if the FCC had imposed a harsher penalty in
Pacifica this might have brought a different result.67 Pacifica specifically
63. The Wilkinson court made the point that in Pacifica, the remedy was extremely mild
compared to the sanctions permitted by Utah's Decency Act. In Pacifica, the FCC simply
made a notation in the file of the radio station, to be considered at the time for license renewal.
By contrast, the Decency Act provided for a $10,000 fine and legal fees for a second offense.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1704. Under such circumstances, it is likely that the Decency Act
could have a chilling effect on cable operators.
64. Moreover, if the cable companies had waited until the state decided to bring a nuisance
suit against them, then the federal district court may have faced the Younger abstention doc-
trine and may have had to decline jurisdiction. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The Supreme Court has seemed to exercise considerable discretion in deciding ripeness issues.
Compare United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (held that the constitutionality
of a provision of the Hatch Act prohibiting a civil servant in the executive branch from taking
part in political campaigns could not be adjudicated until a plaintiff could show that he in-
tended specific acts prohibited by the law) with Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (finding ripeness and constitutionality where federal law limited the
liability of private nuclear plants, but prior to any dispute over liability actually arising, since
the future harm to plaintiffs was sufficiently certain and an important public question was
involved). One commentator has suggested that a review of the cases shows that "no mechani-
cal tests can be applied here." J. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 72 (1983). In the present
case, it is possible to see the chilling effect as an immediate harm of the Decency Act thereby
yielding a justiciable "case or controversy." Indeed, the Wilkinson court noted that the statute
was substantially overbroad and created a significant "chilling effect." 611 F. Supp. at 1106.
65. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743.
66. Id. at 752.
67. 611 F. Supp. at 1110.
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recommended that courts consider the composition of the audience and
the differences between radio, television and closed circuit transmission
when ruling in an indecency case. 68 In following this directive, the Wil-
kinson court pointed out the distinctions between public radio and cable
television, which included the voluntary nature of cable TV, which had
to be specially installed and usually paid for, and the ability of parents to
lock up the programs through a free lock box provided by the cable
company.
From one point of view, however, it may seem that the Wilkinson
court, by virtue of its own reasoning, gave undeserved attention to the
Pacifica holding. After all, if it is assumed that the Policy Act is consti-
tutional, and if it is held that a provision of the Policy Act permits states
to regulate only speech on cable television in areas which have been
deemed wholly unprotected,69 then it is not clear how Pacifica, which
said that indecency is not entirely unprotected, could possibly rescue the
Decency Act.7°
One might have supposed that the purpose of examining the Pacifica
holding was to conduct an indirect examination of the constitutionality
of the Policy Act. If Pacifica guaranteed to the states the right to regu-
late indecency, and if the Policy Act takes that right away, then perhaps
the Policy Act is unconstitutional.
Of course, the Wilkinson court did not reach this question since it
found that Pacifica did not justify the regulations of the Decency Act.
The Wilkinson court distinguished the cable medium from the radio
broadcasting medium by the availability of lock-boxes for cable televi-
sion, the invitation of cable into the home and other factors in order to
conclude that the Policy Act regulation of indecency was not justified
under the rationale of Pacifica.
68. 438 U.S. at 752.
69. The Wilkinson court relied on this rationale for invalidating the Decency Act when it
said "[t]he plain purpose of § 638 is to preserve federal, state and local regulation of unpro-
tected expression in the areas [listed]. Upon examination, Utah's Cable Decency Act does not
appear to fit within § 638 because 'indecent' expression is not wholly unprotected speech." 611
F. Supp. at 1104.
70. If a Supreme Court decision deemed some new area of speech entirely unprotected, it
would, in effect, place that additional area of speech on the list contained in § 638 of the
Decency Act. Yet, the Wilkinson court analyzed Pacifica for more than its decision as to
whether indecency is entirely unprotected speech, as if it were possible that, despite the Court's
decision that indecency is partly protected, Pacifica could somehow rescue the Decency Act.
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has, in the past, declared new areas of speech to be
wholly unprotected. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding child pornog-
raphy not protected under the First Amendment). It seems highly unlikely that the Supreme
Court would come to such an extreme conclusion with regard to "indecency."
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After concluding that Pacifica was inapplicable to the Decency Act,
the Wilkinson court was unable to use its examination of Pacifica as an
indirect vehicle for testing the constitutionality of the Policy Act. This is
not to suggest that the Wilkinson court should have found that Pacifica
would have permitted the Decency Act, simply to resolve the constitu-
tionality of the Policy Act;71 rather, having found that the Policy Act did
not permit state regulation of indecency on preemption grounds, it was
unnecessary to inquire whether Pacifica upset this result. Since the De-
cency Act attempts to regulate speech on cable television that is at least
partially protected, the Decency Act is pre-empted.72
The reason why the Wilkinson court analyzed the holding and rea-
soning of Pacifica so carefully was because it really had a second ration-
ale for invalidating the Decency Act. On this second rationale, the
Policy Act embodied the proposition that the states could regulate cable
television so long as those regulations were not unconstitutional.73 In
this event, it makes a great deal of sense to gauge the adequacy of the
Decency Act in relation to the guidelines provided by Pacifica. On this
premise, the question of the constitutionality of the Decency Act regula-
tions cannot be answered by noting that indecency is not unprotected
speech.
CONCLUSION
The two rationales provided by the Wilkinson court for invalidating
the Decency Act, to some degree, act as support and reinforcement for
one another. They do, however, support implications which are not en-
tirely consistent. The rationale involving invalidation of the Decency
Act, because the Policy Act permits states to regulate only areas of
wholly unprotected speech, suggests that the appropriate remedy for
those in favor of regulating cable indecency is to have Congress amend
the Policy Act to clarify that "indecency" is in the list of areas which the
state can regulate.74
71. Indeed, the Wilkinson court argued that Pacifica would not have permitted the De-
cency Act, even in the absence of the Policy Act.
72. The Wilkinson court could have also said that even if the Policy Act did not exist, the
regulation contemplated by the Decency Act would not have been justified on the basis of
Pacifica.
73. Subsequent to the discussion in which the Wilkinson court concluded that the Decency
Act was invalid because indecency had never been declared unprotected speech, the court said
that the Policy Act preempts state regulation if the state regulation violates the First Amend-
ment. 611 F. Supp. at 1105. See supra note 34.
74. Congress could either explicitly add "indecency" to the laundry list of § 638 or other-
wise indicate that it intended indecency to be an area which the states could regulate. The only
other remedy, upon the first rationale, for those favoring state regulation of cable television,
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On the other hand, the rationale invalidating the Decency Act on
the basis that it was pre-empted because it was an unconstitutional
abridgment of the First Amendment, suggests that a narrowly tailored
time, place and manner regulation might be acceptable. Since the
Supreme Court has merely affirmed 76 the Tenth Circuit which, in turn,
affirmed the decision of the district court which contained both ratio-
nales,77 it is impossible to say, at this time, whether a narrowly tailored
time, place and manner regulation designed for the protection of children
would be constitutional and therefore not preempted.78
It is important to keep a proper perspective on this situation.
Clearly, many "indecency" regulations are intended to interfere with the
First Amendment rights of adults. It is often not an "accident" that they
happen to be drawn in an "overbroad" manner so as to limit the rights of
adults as well as children. Some governmental bodies and many of the
organizations that support such indecency regulations, such as Morality
in Media, would like to have indecency regulations that protect children.
Unfortunately, they are also groups often prepared to support legislation
which would treat adults as if they were children.
Ken Levine
would be for the Supreme Court to declare that indecency is a wholly unprotected area of
speech.
75. An acceptable time, place and manner regulation might permit the showing of sexually
explicit and other "indecent" material late at night on all stations, and at any time of the day
on selected channels, provided parents could lock up these stations to protect their children.
76. See supra note 1.
77. See supra note 73.
78. It is also quite possible that the Wilkinson court thought the Decency Act was pre-
empted not only because it attempted to regulate indecency which has been deemed partially
protected but also because the differences between public radio and cable television were so
significant that the reasoning of Pacifica precluded regulation of indecency on the cable me-
dium. This third rationale, like the first rationale, implies that a narrowly tailored time, place
and manner regulation would be invalid. At this point, we do not know if the higher courts
intended to affirm this rationale or some other.
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